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During the nineties the economic performance of many emerging economies was directly linked to 
their access to foreign capital and its impact on the real exchange rate. Colombia was not an 
exception, as it experienced a sharp boom and bust cycle during the decade. Although a number of 
studies have attempted to explain the underperformance of the Colombian economy since the mid-
1990s, little attention has been given to firm-level evidence. In this paper, we rely on information for 
a large sample of firms during 1995-2001 and examine the impact of exchange and interest rate 
volatility on the level of investment of firms with varying degrees of foreign indebtedness, output 
tradeability, and imported inputs. Our results challenge the friendly view on the effects of 
devaluations on the grounds that firms borrowing in foreign currency faced a currency mismatch 
which produced negative balance-sheet effects. 
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1 Introduction 
 
As it has been the case in many emerging economies, since 1990 the performance of the Colombian 
economy has been closely associated with the evolution of capital flows. Positive and increasing 
levels of capital inflows during the first half of the 1990s allowed for a respectable performance in 
terms of GDP growth. Likewise, a curtailment of foreign financing after 1997 has coincided with 
Colombia’s worst growth performance on record (Figure 1). While ample foreign financing brought 
about an appreciation of the real exchange rate between 1990 and 1997, a significant real 
depreciation was observed since (Figure 2).  
  
Figure 1. Capital Flows and GDP Growth 
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Figure 2. Real Exchange Rate Index (1994=100) 
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Starting in 1990, Colombia has had four distinct exchange rate regimes (Figure 3). Until late 1991 a 
standard crawling peg was in place, supported by an array of capital controls. Between 1992 and 
1993 the central bank issued certificados de cambio (CE) in exchange for foreign currency, thereby 
consolidating into one operation the purchase of foreign exchange and the subsequent sterilization. 
Holders of CE’s could keep them to maturity (originally three months, eventually one year) and 
convert them into pesos at the official exchange rate, or they could sell them upon issuance to the 
central bank at a 12.5% discount. An informal exchange rate band was thus introduced, since CE’s 
could be sold in the secondary market. In 1994 the central bank abandoned its sterilization policy, 
and, thus, the issuance of CE’s. Instead, a formal band was put in place. Since capital inflows 
remained strong, the band had to be shifted down twice during its first year of operation (in the 
pesos per dollar axis, see Fig. 3). After 1997 the critical situation in international capital markets and 
the vulnerability of the peso called for two upward shifts of the band, which was eventually 
abandoned in late 1999, when a floating regime was introduced. 
 
Figure 3. Nominal Exchange Rate  

















































































































  Source: Banco de la República 
 
Since mid-1997, the sharp nominal depreciation notwithstanding, participants in the foreign 
exchange market anticipated that the band was not sustainable, and acted accordingly. As a result, 
the central bank hiked its intervention interest rates. This tightening temporarily made it to the loan 
rate of financial institutions (Figure 4). Once the exchange rate was allowed to float, the trend 
depreciation continued, albeit with much lower interest rates. At the time the band came under 
attack, many analysts and policy-makers argued that the lackluster performance of the economy 
beginning in the second half of 1997 was associated with an ill-conceived monetary and exchange 
rate policy that kept interest rates too high and the domestic currency too strong
1. Under this 
interpretation, floating the currency should have reverted the trend of the key components of 
aggregate demand. In particular, lower interest rates should foster investment and consumption and 
a weaker currency should boost exports. The stylized facts indicate that during the period of floating 
                                                 
1  Prominent interest groups (including the National Federation of Coffee Growers and other exporters) have generally favored a 
weak currency as a key instrument for export promotion and diversification.  For details, see Jaramillo, Steiner and Salazar (2001). 
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the recovery of private consumption and private investment has been far from satisfactory, while 
non-traditional exports
2 have performed reasonably well (Figures 5 and 6). 
 
Figure 4. Real Interest Rates 
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Figure 5. Private Investment and Private Consumption, 1993-2002 
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2  Those different from coffee, oil and coal. 
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Figure 6. Non-Traditional Exports Growth and RERI 
Exports different from coffee, oil and coal  














RERI Non-Trad X (%GDP) - right axis
 
      Source: DANE and Banco de la República 
 
 
The traditional expansionary effect of a devaluation predicted by the Mundell-Fleming model has 
been recurrently subjected to criticism (i.e. Krugman and Taylor, 1978), and challenged on new 
grounds (Calvo, 1999, 2000, Calvo and Reinhart, 2000, Dornbusch, 2001). The basic argument in 
this new strand of literature is that firms and governments that borrow in foreign currency and 
produce an output that is not entirely tradable face a currency mismatch which, following a 
devaluation, can produce a balance sheet effect that offsets any enhancement in competitiveness.
3   
 
Of course, the jury is still out in this respect, and the final verdict has to come form the data 
and the particular conditions of firms in specific countries. In this paper we study the firm-level 
effects of monetary and exchange rate developments in Colombia during 1995-2001. Whether the 
recent relatively poor performance of the Colombian economy is associated with a protracted effect 
of having instrumented a tight monetary policy to defend the currency when it came under attack 
after 1997 and/or with the balance sheet effect associated with the depreciation following the 
floating of the currency is an empirical matter, better addressed at the level of the firm.  
 
In this paper we examine the impact of exchange and interest rate volatility on the level of 
investment of firms with varying degrees of foreign indebtedness, output tradeability, and imported 
inputs. Our main results indicate that the usual expansionary effects of devaluations in investment 
are unlikely to hold for this sample of Colombian firms. There is clear evidence indicating that the 
real exchange rate devaluation had on average a detrimental effect on firm investment. In general, 
this negative effect is larger for firms with a higher share of dollar indebtedness. Our estimations 
                                                 
3  Céspedes et al. (2000) develop a model in which one can introduce a balance sheet effect and still obtain the standard Mundell-
Fleming expansionary results from a devaluation. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2000) introduce domestic credit constraints and offer 
an explanation as to why firms can access foreign financing in spite of the balance sheet effects that ensue from a devaluation.    
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also suggest that the exchange rate level had a positive impact on firm investment. We also find weak 
evidence indicating that the latter effect is higher for exporting firms and lower for firms that import 
part of their inputs. Regarding the role of the interest rate and its interaction with debt maturity, we 
are unable to find robust and significant results on firm investment. We also examine the 
determinants of debt denomination and find that foreign debt is positively correlated with firms´ 
size and, albeit less strongly, with the extent of foreign participation. There is evidence that 
exporting firms and firms in more open sectors tend to have larger shares of dollar debt. 
Nonetheless, imports are a significant determinant of foreign indebtedness as well, given that dollar 
indebtedness is often trade-related. In fact, the effect of imports on debt denomination is several 
times larger than that of exports. Thus, although firms might attempt to “match” their revenue with 
liabilities, importing firms are actually engaged more often in dollar indebtedness.   
 
 
2.  A review of the literature 
 
The friendly view of devaluations has recently been challenged on the grounds that borrowing in 
foreign currency and producing a non-tradable output generates negative balance sheet effects 
during devaluations. We review this line of research in section 2.1. The empirical work on the role of 
real exchange rate changes on firm-level investment is scarce. We review some noteworthy examples 
in section 2.2.  
 
2.1  Exchange rate and balance sheets: the theoretical literature 
 
Largely motivated by the failure of traditional models of balance of payments crisis
4 to explain the 
financial turmoil in emerging markets during the late 1990’s (most notably, the Asian crisis of 1997), 
a number of authors have appealed to an argument that could be called, following Krugman (1999a), 
“open economy Bernanke-Gertler”. According to this view, financial market imperfections imply 
that firm investment is often constrained, so that net worth affects investment levels (Bernanke and 
Gertler, 1989). When combined with substantial levels of foreign currency denominated liabilities, 
this implies the possibility of self-fulfilling crises: a loss of confidence by foreign investors and the 
capital flight that results leads to exchange rate depreciation and to a balance sheet effect that 
depresses investment. A loose monetary policy after the crisis is not a remedy, as it reinforces the 
currency depreciation and its balance sheet effect (Krugman, 1999b).   
 
 Aghion, et al. (2000, 2001) argue that the balance sheet effect of a devaluation might entail a 
decrease in economic activity which reduces money demand and weakens the currency even further. 
A currency crisis is a “bad” equilibrium, with low output and a weak exchange rate. They find that if 
credit supply does not react too strongly to changes in the interest rate, a tight monetary policy is the 
correct prescription to avoid a crisis. Nonetheless, if the rise in interest rates has a significant 
negative effect on future output that exerts downward pressure on the currency, it might be 
impossible to avoid a crisis.   
 
In a series of papers Céspedes, Chang and Velasco support the Mundell-Fleming prediction 
and argue against dollarization. They point out that although a devaluation under “dollarization” of 
                                                 
4 “First generation” models emphasized the role of inflationary financing of budget deficits: fixed exchange rates collapsed as the 
government appealed to seignorage to cover its deficit.  A speculative attack followed as foreign reserves fell below a given level.  
“Second generation” models relied instead on the conflict between a fixed exchange rate and an expansionary monetary policy.  
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liabilities has a detrimental effect on net worth which constrains investment when firms face 
financial frictions, the offsetting effect of increased home output and returns to investment generally 
imply that the standard Mundell-Fleming expansionary effect of devaluations is still generated 
(Céspedes et al., 2000). Nonetheless, balance sheet effects magnify the effects of foreign disturbances 
and might lead to a situation of financial fragility –where devaluations increase the country risk 
premium. The overall impact of a devaluation might indeed be contractionary, but only if inherited 
dollar liabilities are large and international financial markets very imperfect (Céspedes et al., 2002). 
 
Céspedes  et al. (2000) discuss the policy implications of their results. They find that 
fluctuations in domestic output and investment are larger and more persistent under fixed exchange 
rates. Also, under a fixed exchange rate, the impact of a real depreciation, albeit smaller, must be 
achieved through deflation, increasing the real wage and reducing employment if nominal wages are 
sticky. The authors recognize a drawback of their analysis, since under a more complete specification 
of shocks, the expected greater variability of relative prices under floating could endogenously 
increase the country risk premium. For them, this does not necessarily favor fixed rates, as variability 
of relative prices also creates incentives to reduce foreign denominated debt.  
 
This last remark brings us to an important issue. If, as the literature suggests, balance sheets 
matter, why do domestic agents choose to hold foreign denominated liabilities in the first place? 
Explanations of the so called “original sin”—the fact that developing countries cannot borrow in 
their own currencies or at long maturities—range from models that point out moral hazard 
problems of fixed exchange rates and government policy (Burnside, et al. 1999, Schneider and 
Tornell, 2001) to those which consider the role of financial underdevelopment (Caballero and 
Krishnamurthy, 2000).   
 
2.2  Some empirical work 
 
The interaction between dollar indebtedness and exchange rate changes is studied in detail for a 
sample of Latin American firms by Bleakley and Cowan (2002, BC in what follows).  They report 
that the effect of holding dollar debt during a devaluation is positive because the negative net worth 
effect is more than compensated by the effects of a devaluation on earnings. Furthermore, they 
suggest that this results from firms’ matching the currency composition on both sides of their 
balance sheets.  
 
These conclusions are not supported by Aguiar (2002), who studies investment in post-crisis 
Mexican firms, finding an important (negative) “balance sheet effect” of devaluation on investment. 
Even though exporters outperform non-exporters in terms of profits and sales after a devaluation, 
their investment is constrained as a result of holding foreign currency denominated debt. Floating 
the currency also implies an increase in sales volatility, which further reduces investment. Finally, 
Aguiar finds only weak evidence in support of a model of hedging which predicts that the currency 
of debt should match the currency of revenue (i.e. that foreign currency debt payments should 
increase with the covariance of profits and the exchange rate).    
 
An important issue for policy discussion is the role of the exchange rate regime on exchange 
risk hedging. Arteta (2002) uses a database on deposit and credit dollarization in developing and 
transition economies to examine whether flexible exchange rate regimes encourage banks to match 
dollar-denominated liabilities with assets. His results indicate that, if anything, floating regimes tend 
to exacerbate currency mismatches. These results tend to favor the so-called “minority view” which 
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emphasizes that the cost of insurance against exchange rate risk goes up with exchange rate 
volatility. According to Martinez and Werner (2002), the previous results are not supported by the 
Mexican case, where firms took exchange rate risk more seriously after the floating in 1994.   
 
 
3  Analytical framework for the firm-level analysis  
 
In addition to the usual expansionary effect of devaluations, BC consider the fact that for 
dollar-indebted firms devaluations might lead to a decrease in “net worth” due to a currency 
“mismatch” between liabilities and income. This deterioration in balance sheets makes firms appear 
as riskier investments. As a result, they face higher interest rates, which bring about a decline in 
investment. BC’s interesting framework fails to recognize other elements that might play a role in 
determining firms’ investment during devaluations. In Appendix 1 we replicate the BC model and 
extend it in two directions, discussed by the authors but not incorporated in their model. First, firms 
might use imported inputs, challenging the fact that the “competitiveness” effect of a devaluation is 
necessarily positive. Second, firms pay an interest rate that depends not only on its own net worth, 
but also on macroeconomic elements —i.e. quitting the “dogged” defense of the currency allows the 
domestic interest rate to decrease, fostering investment of firms indebted in pesos.  
 
Under both the basic and extended BC frameworks, the effect on investment of a 
devaluation can be either increasing or decreasing in the degree of dollar indebtedness. In the case of 
the extended framework, the source of the ambiguity becomes more difficult to disentangle. For 
instance, in BC there is an unambiguously positive “competitiveness” effect of devaluations coupled 
with an ambiguous “net worth effect” (which depends on the extent of the increase in earnings as 
compared to the rise in the cost of external funds). However, the “competitiveness” effect might be 
negative if imported inputs are important. In the extended framework, in addition to BC’s 
competitiveness and net-worth channels, there is a “macroeconomic channel” affecting firms’ 
investment after devaluations. This channel might have a differential effect on firms with varying 
degrees of foreign and domestic debt levels, and moreover with varying degrees of debt maturity.  
 
 
4 Some  facts 
 
BC’s claim of no evidence of a large, negative net-worth effect on investment following 
devaluations in emerging markets is based on a sample of 2644 publicly traded firms in 5 countries, 
including Colombia. Their sample is not only heavily biased in favor of Brazil and Mexico (1479 and 
577 firms, respectively), countries whose private sectors are not known to have highly dollarized 
liabilities. It is also biased in that publicly traded firms, the source of their sample, are generally the 
largest and most financially sophisticated ones. We use a more representative database, which covers 
an average of 8,246 firms from 1995 through 2001. These firms belong to 66 sectors (4-digit ISIC 
classification), and are under the supervision of the Superintendencia de Sociedades. Only 
commercial firms with assets of at least 20,000 legal minimum monthly wages
5 now have to report 
to the Superintendencia, but the sample also includes smaller firms. Due to procedural changes --the 
Superintendencia now differentiates between inspected (inspeccionadas) and supervised (vigiladas) 
                                                 
5 The current minimum monthly wage is US$110. Hence, only firms with assets above US$2 million are subject to mandatory 
reporting. 
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firms-- there was a non-negligible decrease in the number of firms in 2001. Until 2000 all firms had 
to report their financial statements. Starting in 2001 only vigiladas have to do so.  
 
Firms entering after 1995 or leaving before 2001 because they ceased to operate will allow us to 
work with an unbalanced panel.  Table 1 presents the sectoral distribution of the original data set. 
 
Table 1. Firms per Sector (original data set) 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Agriculture, livestock 769 736 740 719 743 863 463
Mining 233 246 246 250 256 248 191
Manufacturing 2,291 2,237 2,291 2,256 2,416 2,432 1,582
Electricity, gas and water 18 11 17 21 22 21 15
Construction 1,268 1,261 1,313 1,175 1,112 1,073 599
Commerce 2,272 2,185 2,337 2,310 2,344 2,466 1,557
Transport and communication 376 402 461 472 542 616 369
Other services 2,064 2,085 2,191 2,185 2,312 2,993 1,554
Total 9,291 9,163 9,596 9,388 9,747 10,712 6,330 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Superintendencia de Sociedades.   
 
 
We modified the data set in several ways. The following were excluded: 
1)  Firms that do not appear in the sample for at least four consecutive years. This results in 
dropping 6700 firms, which account for roughly 44% of the sample  
2)  65 firms that have no change at all in their level of assets or liabilities in consecutive years.  
3)  6 firms reporting unrealistically low levels of assets. In particular, firms whose assets do not 
exceed $100,000 Colombian pesos (US$35 at current exchange rates), which is nearly a third 
of the legal minimum monthly wage.  
4)  868 firms displaying inconsistent accounting information, including: 
  firms having liabilities that exceed the value of their assets (812 firms) 
  negative operational income (4 firms) 
  short-term assets larger than total assets (7 firms) 
  firms reporting negative values for their total liabilities, any of its components, or on 
interests on their financial liabilities (24 firms) 
  firms in which components of liabilities exceed the total (foreign, domestic, trade 
and financial, 21 firms) 
5)  For estimation purposes we also drop: 
  Outliers (firms for which any of our measures of investment lie in the upper or lower 
3% of the sample)
6.  
  Firms for which we do not have (or are unable to impute) denomination of output 
and inputs in terms of currencies. 100 firms are dropped because of these criteria.  




Table 2 includes the number of firms per year and sector that survived our filtering criteria (1 to 4). 
 
                                                 
6 The sensitivity of results presented in Section 5 to the exclusion of outliers is being revised. 
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Table 2. Firms per Sector (revised data set) 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Agriculture 512 554 599 623 607 567 343
Mining 121 137 156 165 152 137 109
Manufacturing 1638 1735 1860 1915 1837 1749 1203
Electricity, gas and water 6 8 14 15 14 13 10
Construction 649 728 846 881 806 704 406
Commerce 1428 1534 1732 1842 1715 1621 1056
Transport and comunications 253 286 342 355 347 332 219
Services 1335 1466 1668 1771 1647 1538 873
TOTAL 5942 6448 7217 7567 7125 6661 4219 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Superintendencia de Sociedades 
 
 
In what follows, we highlight several characteristics of the firms in our sample. Variables are defined 
in Appendix 2.  
 
On average, total liabilities are close to 48% of total assets at the beginning of the period, and 
nearly 42% by the end (Table 3). The decrease in total leverage occurs in the beginning of the 
period, from 1995 to 1998. The median value of leverage is close to the average. Apparently, firms 
have moved to more “conservative” indebtedness, although a few still have liabilities that are as large 
as their own assets, as indicated by the last column of the Table.   
 
The breakdown of liabilities by currency denomination and maturity is presented in Table 4 for 
the year 2000
7. Firms hold a large proportion of short-term debt (close to 75% on average and about 
90% for the median firm; short term is less than one year).  This is consistent with the available 
evidence on firms’ financial opportunities in Colombia, where internal resources are often the source 
of funding for investment, whereas debt is a source of working capital. 
 
Table 3. Firm Leverage, descriptive statistics  
Total Debt to Total Assets (%) 
Year Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
1995 47.79 50.61 26.08 0.00 100
1996 45.35 46.92 25.72 0.00 100
1997 44.54 45.72 26.27 0.00 100
1998 43.02 43.39 26.43 0.00 100
1999 42.28 41.77 26.36 0.00 100
2000 41.89 41.38 26.24 0.00 100
2001 42.13 42.27 26.33 0.00 100  
     Source: Authors’ calculations based on Superintendencia de Sociedades 
                                                 
7 Yearly information is available upon request.  Ratios vary little through time.  Despite the real depreciation of the currency, the share 
of dollar debt increases very slightly during the period, from 4.9% of total liabilities in 1995 to 5.8% in 2001.  
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Table 4. Debt Maturity and Denomination, descriptive statistics for 2000 (%) 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Balance sheet information (Total liabilities)
Short Term Debt/Total Debt 76.66 93.40 30.42 0.00 100.00
Annex information (Financial and trade 
liabilities)
Dollar Debt/Total Debt 5.47 0.00 14.79 0.00 99.98
Short Term Dollar Debt/Dollar Debt 92.19 100.00 24.82 0.00 100.00
Short Term Domestic Debt/Domestic Debt 78.88 100.00 32.36 0.00 100.00  
  Source: Authors’ calculations based on Superintendencia de Sociedades 
 
The share of “dollar” debt
8 is low on average (close to 5% of total debt) and most firms hold no 
foreign currency denominated liabilities (the median firm has no dollar debt). Nonetheless, a few 
hold a disproportionate share (the firm holding the largest share of foreign debt holds nearly 100% 
of its debt in dollars). The median firm holds its entire domestic and dollar debt in the form of 
short-term debt for all years. Also, the proportion of short-term debt is higher on average for dollar 
debt. Below we show the breakdown of liabilities between trade and financial debt. 
 
“Dollar indebtedness” appears to be relatively unimportant for this large sample of firms. Yet, 
how important is foreign indebtedness among those firms that do hold foreign currency liabilities? 
About 26% of the firms in our sample hold a positive amount of dollar debt (Table 5). Firms 
indebted abroad hold on average 19% of their liabilities in dollars. The share of firms indebted 
abroad and, more surprisingly, their average indebtedness does not change much, despite the recent 
devaluation. The only exception is 2001, the year in which our sample changes to include mostly 
firms that are vigiladas. In this year, the share of firms indebted abroad rises to nearly 33% of the 
entire sample. These (larger) firms hold dollar denominated debt more often. In 2001 average 
indebtedness in dollars falls from 20.4% to 17.5% of total debt.  Thus, although larger firms that are 
vigiladas are more frequently indebted in dollars, they now apparently hold a smaller share of their 
debt in dollars. The share of dollar debt for the median firm is always about a half of the share for 
the average firm; that is, most firms are either on the conservative side, or lack access to that 
financial market, with a few holding a disproportionate share of their debt in dollars. 
 
Table 5. Dollar Debt as % of Total Debt 
Year Number of firms As percent of sample Mean Median Std. Dev.
1995 1679 26.06 18.93 9.50 22.34
1996 1820 26.53 18.47 9.50 21.80
1997 1991 26.03 19.07 10.44 22.13
1998 2021 25.59 18.77 9.71 21.89
1999 1977 26.05 18.77 10.13 21.89
2000 1931 26.85 20.35 11.14 22.60
2001 1492 32.97 17.45 8.92 20.77
Observations
    Source: Authors’ calculations based on Superintendencia de Sociedades 
                                                 
8 Strictly speaking, “dollar” debt might actually be a combination of debt denominated in a basket of foreign currencies. It is 
impossible to disentangle the exact currency composition of foreign denominated liabilities in the data set.   
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Trade-linked debt accounts for nearly 20% of total liabilities on average, with most firms being on 
the low side (Table 6). We only show statistics for 2000 as there is no significant variation through 
time. Financial debt, in turn, is nearly 25% of total liabilities. Other liabilities (including bonds, 
liabilities with shareholders, among others) account for the remaining 55% of liabilities. Despite the 
fact that foreign trade debt represents on average a small share of total trade debt, and that the 
median firm holds no trade debt in dollars (not shown) most foreign currency denominated debt is 
trade debt (85% on average, and 100% of dollar debt for the median firm). Domestic debt is more 
evenly divided between trade and financial debt. Still, a number of firms hold a large amount of their 
trade debt in dollars (at least one holds its entire trade debt in dollars). This is also true for financial 
debt (not shown). 
 
Turning to the revenue side, most firms do not export their output, although a few export 
their entire output (Table 7). The share of income generated abroad, while still low, has increased 
substantially through time, from 4.5% of total revenue to 7.1%. As the median firm illustrates, this 
effect was not widespread, and occurred especially in the aftermath of the exchange rate devaluation.  
 
A large proportion of firms in our sample lack information on imported inputs. 
Furthermore, reported figures on imported inputs are often unreliable. We rely on sectoral data on 
imported inputs for estimation purposes,  using the most disaggregated information available on 
inputs purchased (see Table 8). When detailed sectoral data on import orientation is examined, it is 
impossible to identify a general trend. Indeed, for most sectors imported input shares do not change 
much through time, though there is a significant heterogeneity in terms of import orientation and its 
evolution by sector.   
 
Table 6. Breakdown of Liabilities between Financial and Trade Debt, 2000 
All ratios in percentage 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Trade Debt/Total Debt 19.70 9.07 24.16 0.00 100.00
Foreign Trade Debt/Total Foreign Debt 85.55 100.00 33.11 0.00 100.00
Domestic Trade Debt/Total Domestic Debt 39.83 27.97 37.44 0.00 100.00
Financial Debt/Total Debt 24.82 15.21 26.95 0.00 100.00
Other Liabilities/Total Debt 55.48 52.91 33.06 0.00 100.00  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Superintendencia de Sociedades 
Table 7. Composition of Output in Terms of Currencies 
Ratio of exports to total revenue, in percent 
Year Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
1995 4.43 0.00 17.05 0.00 100.00
1996 4.52 0.00 17.25 0.00 100.00
1997 4.65 0.00 17.53 0.00 100.00
1998 4.79 0.00 17.35 0.00 100.00
1999 5.36 0.00 18.39 0.00 100.00
2000 5.83 0.00 18.88 0.00 100.00
2001 7.07 0.00 19.74 0.00 100.00  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Superintendencia de Sociedades 
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Table 8. Import Orientation of Firms, sectoral data 
Imported input share as percentage of total expenditure on materials 
 
Sectors  1994 1995  1996 1997  1998  1999  2000 
Agriculture  10.81  10.59  11.39 9.99  10.69  9.85 10.79 
Non-toasted and non-decaffeinated coffee  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.01 0.00  0.00  0.00
Other agricultural products  24.96  24.98  25.97 23.46  25.45  22.99 24.45 
Animals and animal products  0.98 0.69  0.81 0.40 0.34  0.21  0.27
Forestry, fishing and mining 
Forestry  10.21  10.51  8.45 9.25 10.06  11.23 12.16 
Fish and other products from fishing   0.01 0.01  0.03 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00
Coal, lignite, and peat  0.41 0.39  0.61 0.63 0.71  0.82  1.22
Crude oil, natural gas and other minerals  0.00 0.01  0.48 0.02 0.02  1.90  3.05
Metal minerals  6.72 4.43  8.85 54.90  15.66  15.59 16.81 
Other non-metallic minerals  7.74 6.59  6.91 7.19 7.21  5.56  5.74
Gas and electricity  0.00 0.06  0.09 0.04 0.12  0.07  0.14
Water, sewage system, waste disposal and sanitation  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00
Manufacturing industry  34.05  34.62  34.67  35.49  35.33  31.30  31.61 
Production, transformation and conservation of beef and fish  12.92  16.01  17.99 18.29  18.84  22.12 22.97 
Fruit, vegetable and bean production; oils  19.99  22.11  24.17 23.37  27.24  27.02 30.63 
Dairy products  7.63 10.62  11.90 16.74  17.71  11.53 13.77 
Meals and starches  8.55 6.92  6.59 7.21 6.29  5.35  6.88
Sugar mills and refineries  3.49 4.54  0.43 0.77 0.72  2.70  2.30
Coffee threshing  0.04 0.22  0.12 0.49 0.37  0.21  1.46
 Bakery products  36.61  48.09  48.58 49.83  45.94  40.53 37.46 
Other food products  24.43  27.55  28.59 30.31  33.02  30.01 32.92 
Beverages  19.72  21.79  22.63 24.57  24.06  20.24 19.42 
Tobacco products  97.39  98.18  98.45 98.23  98.47  97.24 97.35 
Textile products spinning, weaving and finishing  11.55  12.72  12.21 12.81  15.22  17.96 28.60 
Other textile products *  53.98  56.54  56.80 56.58  56.06  54.99
Hand and machine knits and crochet articles; garments and clothing 
manufacturing 85.43  84.54  84.16 84.95  84.77  81.30 80.94 
Leather tanning and preparation; Shoe manufacturing  27.72  30.37  29.95 31.35  38.10  32.75 34.68 
Wood sawing, wood sheets; Carpentry pieces and parts for constructions; Other 
wood, cork and basketry products  5.56 5.13  5.70 5.70 4.73  5.29  6.69
Paper, cardboard and their products  17.12  16.99  16.25 17.18  17.11  15.44 13.70 
Printing and publishing activities  16.76  17.97  17.55 17.79  19.12  15.50 15.13 
Oil refinery and by-products  17.55  17.83  15.48 16.30  14.53  11.65 8.69
Basic chemical substances, synthetic and artificial fibres  32.02  32.86  34.24 35.24  35.91  34.66 35.85 
Rubber and plastic products  11.46  13.76  15.32 16.51  16.64  16.34 17.46 
Glass and glass products  7.96 9.03  9.27 10.25  10.07  8.90  8.78
Furniture manufacture  65.31  69.38  69.84 71.35  70.77  65.92 64.93 
Waste recycling 36.88  36.00  45.52 42.55  45.49  42.99 39.81 
Basic iron and steel industries; metal foundry; Basic precious metal and non  
ferrous industries; Manufacture of metal products  24.60  26.09  25.84 25.59  25.55  21.34 25.87 
General and special use machinery  64.98  66.23  64.73 64.15  61.95  61.02 60.56 
Other machinery and electrical appliances  69.19  71.56  70.69 70.99  72.01  69.41 69.08 
Automotive vehicles and their engines; Bodies for automotive vehicles  64.95  60.91  56.66 58.36  55.01  53.21 49.73 
Buildings and strucutures 
Buildings, structures and related activities  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00




Reparation of automotive vehicles, personal and domestic appliances.   0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00
Hotels and restaurants.  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00
Land transportation.  1.31 1.10  1.18 1.74 5.67  1.03  1.20
Water transportation  83.50  82.25  80.31 83.03  80.60  79.15 80.60 
Air transportation  34.46  35.51  36.43 35.98  35.93  33.25 38.74 
Transport services.  19.98  20.72  21.19 18.78  17.22  18.33 16.32 
Postal and telecomunication services  10.21  8.15  7.08 5.94 7.24  5.05  4.96
Financial intermediation and related services 6.02 5.83  5.38 5.37 5.74  4.72  5.02
Real state services and home rentals  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00
Other services to enterprises excluding real state  7.08 8.47  12.58 10.37  11.24  12.81 11.03 
Domestic services 
Education  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00
Social Services  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00
* In 2000 this category is merged with Textile products spinning, weaving and 
finishing 
**By construction, commerce purchases no intermediate inputs. 
 
Source: DANE 
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Regarding the dependent variable, the rate of investment in fixed capital is defined as net 
purchases of property, plant and equipment as percent of total assets. Its evolution is presented in 
Table 9.
9 The mean indicates that fixed capital investment decreased sharply from 1996 to 1997 and 
slightly until its lowest level in 1999; thereafter, a mild recovery is observed. Overall, the rate of fixed 
capital investment falls from about 3.02% of assets in 1996 to 1.16% in 2000. Most firms are in the 
low side, with investment falling for the median firm from a rate of 0.95% to 0.16% of total assets 
during the same period. 
 
Table 9. Fixed Capital Investment 
Ratio of yearly investment to total assets, in percentage 
after eliminating extreme values 
Year Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
1996 3.02 0.95 5.78 -7.95 114.39
1997 1.68 0.31 5.40 -69.32 93.46
1998 1.50 0.28 4.72 -45.27 85.17
1999 1.10 0.15 3.28 -44.39 40.55
2000 1.16 0.16 3.30 -51.38 19.56
2001 1.24 0.28 2.84 -25.69 16.72  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Superintendencia de Sociedades 
 
 
We now turn to a more detailed description of the main correlates of firms’ characteristics, as well as 
their evolution through time. We identify each firm as belonging to one of four zones: hell, heaven, 
hedge, and demand only. Firms are in hell when their output is denominated in domestic currency, yet 
have a large share of foreign denominated liabilities. These are the firms that potentially face the 
strongest balance sheet effect during real exchange rate devaluations. In the opposite extreme, firms 
in heaven sell a large proportion of their output in dollars, yet have a low share of dollar debt. Firms 
that are highly indebted in dollars but nonetheless have a tradable output are hedged. Finally, firms 
with low levels of exports and dollar indebtedness only face the “demand channel” of a devaluation. 
The distribution of firms and the average value of assets for firms in each zone is presented for 2000 
only, as it varies little through time
10.  
 
As shown in Figure 7 an overwhelming majority of the firms in our sample belong to the 
“demand only” zone (92.2%). Firms in Heaven follow in importance (4.2%), whereas just a few 
firms are Hedged (0.3%). Finally, firms in Hell account for 3.3% of total firms. In terms of size, 
Firms in Heaven are the smallest; the numerous firms in the Demand Only zone are also small, 
whereas those Hedged and in Hell are relatively large. It seems that only large firms have foreign 
debt, and that larger does not necessarily mean more export oriented.  
 
                                                 
9 In unreported estimations we also considered investment in inventories—the real change in inventories as percent of total assets—as 
an alternative dependent variable. Results were counterintuitive or non significant, revealing the fact that inventory accumulation is 
both an intended and an unintended process. 
10 Obviously, firms in Heaven are actually in Hell as a result of a real exchange rate appreciation.  
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on Superintendencia de Sociedades 
Note: Ratio of Foreign Debt to Total Debt and of Operational Income Generated Abroad to Total Operational Income, in percentage 
        Average value of assets for firms in each zone in 1995 Colombian pesos (in thousands) 
 
 



























Source: Authors’ calculations based on Superintendencia de Sociedades 
Note: Ratio of Foreign Debt to Total Debt and of Operational Income Generated Abroad Net of Imports to Total Operational Income, in percent 
        Average value of assets for firms in each zone in 1995 Colombian pesos (in thousands) 
 
From Figure 7 one is tempted to infer that it is unlikely to find a contractionary effect of 
devaluations on investment in this sample of firms. Firms in Hell, though large, are  an almost 
negligible proportion of total firms. Nonetheless, the former classification has left out an important 
channel identified in our empirical framework through which a devaluation affects firm 
performance: imported inputs. To take this cost channel into account, in Figure 8 we consider net 
exports in the horizontal axis. Net exports are defined as the difference between operational income 
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generated abroad and imports of goods and raw materials, and are expressed as a percentage of total 
operational income. Figure 8 tells an interesting story: even though it is true that most firms face 
only the demand channel, several others have negative net exports. Thus, these firms are most likely 
harmed by the “competitiveness” effect. If, in addition, they have a large share of foreign debt (as 
some do), they are harmed on both accounts; that is, their situation is worse than Hell: Hell-squared. 
 
  When examined by sector, exports, imports, foreign debt and short term debt behave as 
follows (Figure 9 to 12): exports are important for firms in agriculture, manufacturing, and mining, 
although most firms do not export at all, regardless of which sector they are in. On the other hand, 
several sectors seem to be affected by the cost of inputs channel. This includes sectors that are 
important exporters as well as others which are not. Foreign debt is also important for a number of 
sectors, even though firms are typically not indebted in dollars. In particular, the electricity, gas and 
water sector (made up of a few and large firms) is highly indebted in dollars. This sector is also a net 
importer. Transportation and Commerce are in a similar situation. The importance of short-term 
debt for all firms is underscored by Figure 12. 
 
 
Figure 9. Share of  Exports, by sector 
Operational income generated abroad as percent of total operational 
income, all years  








































































































Figure 10. Share of  Imports, by sector 
Purchases of goods and raw materials from abroad as 









































































































Figure 11. Share of Foreign debt, by sector 
Total foreign debt as percent of total debt, all year 







































































































Figure 12. Share of Short Term Debt, by sector 
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5  Estimation and results 
 
5.1  Devaluation, interest rate volatility and investment 
 
There are a number of studies on firm-level investment in Colombia that might shed light on 
the expected role of an exchange rate depreciation. Several authors have found that credit 
constraints are important for Colombian firms (Kugler, 1998c, Arbeláez and Echavarría , 2002). 
Several studies suggest mitigating factors with respect to the potential competitive effect of 
devaluations. Tybout and Roberts (1997) find that fixed costs to export are important for 
Colombian manufacturers. This might induce export hysterisis (Dixit, 1989; Krugman, 1989), as only 
firms already exporting are likely to react, unless the devaluation is drastic. Das et al. (2001) find that 
most of the entry and exit into foreign markets takes place among marginal exporters, who 
contribute little to aggregate export revenues. Brooks (2001) shows that Colombian manufacturers 
tended to under export to the United States from 1981 to 1991 because their products were of 
inferior quality. Hence, even if Colombian products are cheaper, unless a threshold quality level is 
reached, devaluation will not result in higher exports. Fernandes (2001) finds that lower tariffs in 
Colombia yielded higher productivity for manufacturing exporters in the 1980's. More recently, 
Medina et. al. (2003) find that protectionist policy in the form of tariffs has slowed down 
productivity growth during the nineties. These results could be driven by the fact that expensive 
imported inputs hindered productivity during protection. Likewise, devaluations could be 
detrimental to the performance of plants in technology-intensive sectors, which are most likely to be 
exporters, and have relatively high utilization of imported capital and intermediate inputs. 
Furthermore, Fernandes’ estimations indicate that real exchange rate devaluation is associated with a 
decrease in plant productivity in traded industries relative to productivity gains in non-traded 
industries. As far as we are aware, ours is the first attempt, other than Bleakley and Cowan, to 
explicitly incorporate the role of foreign debt when analyzing the effects of exchange rate changes 
on firm performance. 
 
Our interest is to estimate
11 alternative specifications of the following investment equation, 
motivated by the theoretical framework presented in section 3 and Appendix 1:  
 
(1)  ( ) () ( )
() t i t i t t i t t i
t t t i t t i t BS t i i it
i STD i D
e e IMP e EX e D I
, , 10 1 , 8 7
*
1 , 6
5 1 , 4 1 , 3
*
1 , 2 1
ε β β β β
β β β β µ β
+ Χ + × + + +
+ × + × + ∆ × + + =
− −
− − −
r   
 
where,   is the rate of fixed capital investment at time t for firm i, with investment in property, 
plant and equipment normalized by total assets. The main effect that we want to capture is the  
interaction between the inflation-adjusted devaluation of the bilateral exchange rate (with the U.S., 
), and dollar debt at the beginning of t: .  
it I




Two alternative definitions of   are considered: the ratio of lagged dollar debt to total 
debt and to total assets for firm i.  Since foreign debt is presumably denominated in dollars, to 
capture the “balance sheet effect” we define exchange rate,e  as the nominal bilateral exchange 
*
1 , − t i D
BSt
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11 Estimations in this subsection were undertaken using DPD for OX developed by Manuel Arellano, Stephen Bond and Jurgen A. 
Doornik.   
rate with the U.S. adjusted by domestic inflation. By interacting the (log) percentage change in this 
real exchange rate index with the share of foreign debt, we aim to capture the differential effect that 




In addition, we include the direct effect of e , the effective real exchange rate-–an index 
constructed as a weighted average of bilateral exchange rates with Colombia’s 20 main trading 
partners. The investment response to higher exchange rate levels might vary for firms with different 
degrees of output and input tradeability. Thus, we include additional terms interacting the exchange 
rate with lagged exports ( ) and with lagged imports ( )  
t
1 , − t i EX 1 , − t i IMP
 
As noted above, we might see firms investing more after a devaluation not because 
individually they benefit from a “competitiveness effect” but because collectively this allowed for a 
looser monetary policy. Likewise, we could see them investing less not because of a balance sheet 
effect of dollar indebtedness but because they face higher interest rates under a dogged defense of 
the currency.  Thus, we directly include the role of the lending real interest rate, i . Lagged short 
term debt,  , and its interaction with this average domestic lending interest rate, is included to 
uncover the differential role of changes  in  interest rates depending on the maturity of debt.  
t
1 , − t i STD
 
All specifications consider firm fixed effects. In (1) we define  t i i µ β β + = 1   as the intercept 
for the ith firm with β  as the mean intercept and  i µ the difference from this mean for the ith firm.  
An additional set of regressors detailed below are summarized by   it Χ .  
 
  We begin by mimicking BC’s version of equation (1). That is, we initially include only the 
following effects: dollar debt, total leverage, and exchange rate devaluation and its interaction with 
dollar debt. Furthermore, instead of considering the level of the exchange rate, we consider its (log) 
percentage change. Alternative specifications of such regressions are reported in Table 10. In 
columns 1 and 2, dollar debt is normalized by total debt, whereas the two final columns include 
dollar debt to total assets. The first point that should be highlighted is that the direct and independent effect of the 
real exchange rate depreciation is consistently negative. Likewise, the interaction of the bilateral exchange rate 
devaluation with dollar debt is consistently negative and significant
13. This result stands in stark 
contrast with the one reported by BC for their sample of Latin American corporations. Our results 
suggest that holding dollar debt during devaluations is detrimental for investment. Moreover, 
devaluation has a negative effect on investment irrespective of the denomination of their debt. In 
columns 2 and 4 we directly control for the share of exports and imported inputs and their 
interaction with real exchange rate devaluation. Although lagged imports have an unexpected 
negative effect on fixed capital investment, none of the additional variables are significant and, more 
importantly, results for real exchange rate devaluation and its interaction with debt remain 
                                                 
12 We performed estimations for end of period and average percentage change of .  To ease reading, we shall present results with 
the former measure, noting which results change when average depreciation is considered instead. Estimations using average 
depreciation rates are available upon request.  
BSt e
13 When interacting the (bilateral) real exchange rate depreciation with the level of dollar debt, the results are sensitive to whether end-
of-period or average devaluation is used. Indeed, when using averages the interaction is positive but not significant.  
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unchanged
14. Regarding other controls, investment depends positively, and in a significant manner, 
on sectoral output growth, whereas firm’s leverage does not have a significant effect
15.  
 
In short, the results from Table 10, which replicate in our own sample of firms the 
estimation undertaken by BC for a sample of Latin American corporations, indicate that there is a 
clear evidence of a negative effect of devaluations and that foreign indebtedness makes matters 
worse. Although these estimations are a useful starting point, there are a number of limitations in the 
approach. In what follows, we include the level of the exchange rate in our regressions. This 
approach allows us to move closer to most empirical approximations of the determinants of exports 
and imports. We also allow for the real exchange rate effect to vary according to the tradeability of 
each firm’s input and output. In addition, we control directly for the level of the interest rate and the 
maturity structure of indebtedness.  
 
On more technical grounds, a major drawback of the estimations reported thus far is that, 
although the within estimator eliminates the inconsistency arising from the fact that firm-specific 
effects might be correlated with the set of independent variables, it does not account for the fact 
that most right hand side variables might be endogenous. For instance, the share of imported inputs 
might be endogenous to the level of investment. Also, one might be interested in allowing the 
investment regressions to have a dynamic structure..   
 
A Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator based on the use of lagged 
observations of the dependent and explanatory variables allows us to deal with both of these 
problems (Arellano and Bover, 1995). To address the problem of possible omitted variable bias 
induced by firm specific effects, the regression equation is differenced.  Also, to address the problem 
of joint endogeneity, suitably lagged values of the original (i.e. measured in levels) independent 
variables, including the lagged value of the dependent variable, are used as instruments for the right 
hand side variables (i.e. the differenced values of the original regressors) of the transformed 
equation. The validity of the moment conditions implicit in this “GMM difference estimator” are 
tested statistically.  First, we present results for a Sargan test of over identifying restrictions that 
checks the overall validity of these moment conditions.  Failure to reject this test indicates validity of 
the moment conditions. Under the maintained assumption that the error term of the original 
dynamic levels equation is serially uncorrelated, the transformed error term for the difference 
equation is expected to have serial correlation of first order, but no serial correlation of second 
order. Thus we report AR(1) and AR(2) tests on the lack of serial correlation for the transformed 
error term
16. These tests statistics are asymptotically normal under the null of no serial correlation. 
 
 
                                                 
14 There might be a chance for measurement error in the export and import variables if firms do not export/import directly but rather 
through an intermediary. As explained above, imported inputs data is imputed from sectoral data but we do rely on balance sheet data 
on exports for our baseline estimations. When sectoral data for exports is included results are unchanged. 
15 Notice that whereas dollar debt is interacted with the bilateral real exchange rate (BRER) devaluation, when devaluation enters 
independently it is measured by the effective (multilateral) real exchange rate (RER) devaluation. When the BRER depreciation is 
included instead, the resulting direct effect is still negative and much larger, yet in this case the interaction term ceases to enter 
significantly. Thus, the depreciation of the BRER has a detrimental effect on investment, irrespective of the denomination of debt.  
16 One may allow for the error term of the original levels equation to follow an autoregressive process of finite order, as long as there 
are enough time series to estimate the parameters.  For example, if the original error term is MA(1), the differenced error term is 
MA(2) and only lags of the dependent variables dated t-2 are available as instruments for the differenced equation. See Bond [2002] 
for an intuitive review on this and other issues concerning GMM estimators for dynamic panel data models.  Unless otherwise stated, 
we stick to the assumption of no serial correlation in the residuals and use instruments dates t-2 and earlier.  
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Table 10. Fixed Capital Investment Regressions (BC) 
Exchange Rate in (log) percentage changes 
 ( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )
DIRECT EFFECTS
      
∆ Log (real exchange rate) -0.0585038*** -0.0459509*** -0.0590216*** -0.0463386***
  (0.006426) (0.008814) (0.006381) (0.008793)
      
INTERACTIONS     
      
∆ Log (end of period bilateral US "real exchange rate") x 
Dollar Debt -0.0506702** -0.050536** -0.0877725** -0.086709**
  (0.0209) (0.02102) (0.03905) (0.03931)
      
Lagged Exports x Devaluation  0.00032903   0.000327988
   (0.0003509)  (0.0003513)
      
Lagged Imports x Devaluation  -0.000351108  -0.000357374
   (0.000265)  (0.000265)
      
CONTROLS     
      
Lagged "Dollar" Debt to Total Debt -0.00330865 -0.00384471 -0.00887189 -0.00893557
  (0.004958) (0.004946) (0.01057) (0.01061)
      
Lagged Exports  0.00151932  0.00145488
   (0.004334)  (0.004338)
      
Lagged Imports  -0.0123029***  -0.0122769***
   (0.002521)   (0.00252)
      
Leverage 0.00554653 0.00500553 0.00564034 0.00508707
  (0.00385) (0.003844) (0.003896) (0.003889)
      
Sectorial Output Growth 0.0115748** 0.0171592*** 0.0115091** 0.0171221***
  (0.00523) (0.005524) (0.005228) (0.005524)
      
      
R^2 0.01547785 0.01806729 0.01547785 0.01806729
Observations 15900 15900 15900 15900
Wald Test (joint) 181.8 [0.000] ** 205.8 [0.000] ** 182.3 [0.000] ** 207.0 [0.000] **
Notes     
Estimates using within estimator, robust standard errors in parenthesis
p- values fo regression statistics appear in [ ]
*, significant at the 90% level, **at the 95%, *** at the 99%
Dependent variable: Fixed Capital Investment




A drawback of the first differenced GMM estimator is that the instruments available for the 
transformed regression equation are weak when the individual series have near unit root properties. 
Indeed, if the series are highly persistent, their differences are nearly innovations and there are no 
good instruments for near white noise series. Thus, the GMM difference estimator can be subject to 
finite sample biases. This potential bias can be reduced using the “GMM system estimator” 
proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995). This estimator combines the regression expressed in first 
differences with the original equation expressed in levels. As before, suitably lagged values of the 
dependent variables in levels are used as instruments for the differenced equation, whereas the 
equation in levels is instrumented with lagged differences of the explanatory variables. Both the 
Sargan and serial correlation tests are examined in this case. A Difference Sargan Test is also useful 
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in this context, since the set of moment conditions specified under the simple difference estimator is 
a subset of the one considered in the system estimator
17. The difference between the Sargan statistic 
obtained under the system estimator and the one obtained under the difference estimator is 
asymptotically distributed   with degrees of freedom given by the difference between the number 
of degrees of freedom of the system estimator and that of the difference estimator. Failure to reject 




Results for the modified specifications and for two types of estimation techniques (static 
fixed effects and GMM Difference) are presented in Table 11. In general, the additional moment 
restrictions implied by the GMM System estimator, valid under a mean stationary assumption for 
the set of variables to be instrumented, were rejected according to the Sargan and Difference Sargan 
Tests in most of our specifications, despite the fact that the AR(1) and AR(2) statistics show 
satisfactory results. Thus, we present the system GMM System results in Appendix 3 and base our 
discussion in the fixed effects and GMM difference results. Appendix 3 also includes a number of 
additional regression results to verify the robustness of our baseline regressions to alternative 
specifications and data definitions.   
  
Table 11 confirms that the effect of the bilateral real exchange rate devaluation is negative, 
significant, and economically meaningful under all estimation techniques. The lack of significance of 
the interactive term of real exchange rate devaluation with dollar indebtedness reveals further that 
there is on average a detrimental effect on investment irrespective  of the denomination of firms’ debt. 
Nonetheless, our estimations also imply that there is a positive impact of the level of the exchange 
rate on investment. According to our fixed effects regression in Table 11, this effect is higher for 
exporting firms and lower for importing firms. The GMM regressions, on the other hand, suggest 
that the average effect is the same for all firms irrespective of  the denomination of their inputs and 
output
19. A noteworthy result from our basic estimations is the fact that the real interest rate, 
arguably an important determinant of firm investment, is only significantly negative in one of our 
specifications.
20 We further interacted the level of the interest rate with the share of short-term 
domestic debt, since presumably those firms that are highly indebted domestically in the short term 
face a “maturity mismatch” that constraints investment. This term has the expected sign both in the 
fixed effects and GMM difference estimators, yet it is never significant
21.  
                                                 
17 The Difference Sargan Test is also useful in determining the lags available for instrumenting right hand side variables. Indeed, when 
right hand side variables are endogenous—correlated with present and past variables of the regression disturbance—lags dated t-2 and 
onwards are available as valid instruments. If these variables are predetermined—correlated with past variables of the regression 
disturbance— then lags dated t-1 also become available and if the variable is strictly exogenous then current values (dated t) are also 
available as valid instruments. In all specifications below, firm-specific characteristics are lagged one period, so we usually assumed 
that these variables are predetermined. Nonetheless, when more than one specification was valid according to Sargan tests, we relied 
on the Difference Sargan Test to choose the preferred specification.  
18  We present both one-step and two-step results (with finite sample correction) for the difference estimator and system estimators. 
19 As in our BC type of regressions, we checked the sensitivity of these results to the inclusion of sectoral data on exports. Results 
were qualitatively unchanged (i.e. the interaction of exports and the exchange rate level remained insignificant under the GMM 
regressions). For all tables reported below, we checked the sensitivity of the results to the inclusion of sectoral or firm-level data. 
Results did not change, unless otherwise stated. 
20 This finding is consistent with previous studies on the determinants of investment at the macro level. For instance, Ocampo et. al. 
(1988) survey the evidence on the determinants of investment in Colombia and conclude that, with a few exceptions, there is no 
significant impact of the real interest rate on investment. These results are confirmed by Fainboim (1990) who finds that the price of 
capital and tax policy are important determinants of investment, whereas the real interest rate is relevant only for a few sectors. 
21 Since most domestic debt is actually short-term, we checked for the sensitivity of the results presented in Table 11 and in tables 
presented below using an alternative measure of short term indebtedness: short-term debt to total debt, irrespective of whether it is 
domestic or foreign. Results hardly change, probably because most debt is actually domestic. Also, in Appendix tables 3 and 4  we 
repeat the estimations presented in Table 11, but drop the interest rate and its interactions. Results in these tables are quite similar to 
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Regarding the controls, investment now depends positively and significantly on lagged 
imports in the case of the fixed effects estimation. This is a reasonable result to the extent that the 
fixed effects regression does not control for the endogeneity of imports. Nonetheless, imports are 
not significant under any of the GMM estimations, and the only additional significant controls are 
leverage (with a positive sign
22) and sectoral output growth (with a positive sign) in the GMM 
System regression that appears in the Appendix. Note also that in the last three columns of Table 
11, we check the sensitivity of our results to the definition of dollar debt and find that when 
normalizing dollar debt by total assets rather than by total debt, results hardly change. One 




It should also be noted that although we run regressions instrumenting for all the firm-
specific explanatory variables, we report only a small subset of the estimations undertaken –-i.e. 
those in which we only instrument for the intuitively “most endogenous” variables, the level of 
imports and the level of foreign debt. Also, although we run regressions using all available lags as 
instruments, we only report those in which three lags were used–-thereby minimizing the possibility 
of an “over fitting bias.” A final point regarding econometrics is that, in this context, estimating the 
dynamic specifications with the fixed effects and OLS estimators is potentially useful, since the 
former is usually biased downwards and the latter upwards. For all reported estimations, we run 




Our results tend to give an important role to the tradeability terms only in the fixed effects 
regressions. Indeed, after controlling for endogeneity and adding the lagged dependent variable, the 
interaction of exports and imports with the exchange rate is usually not significant. As noted above, 
there might be a chance for measurement error in the export and import variables if firms do not 
export/import directly but rather through an intermediary
25. Although there is no simple way to 
capture this problem in the data, we performed some additional regressions that are reported in the 
Appendix. Appendix Table 5 reports some estimations including a sectoral variable that indicates the 
openness of the sector and its interaction with the level of the RER itself and excluding the export 
and imports interactions. The sectoral variable refers to the sum of exports and imports of goods 
produced by each sector, normalized by the sector’s total production
26. Besides from the fact that 
these regressions do not challenge our basic results, we believe that they are problematic in that the 
degree of sectorial openness actually captures a number of factors in addition to the tradeability of 
each firm’s inputs and output.   
 
                                                                                                                                                               
those presented in Table 11. The only relevant change refers to sectoral output growth, which is no longer relevant under the System 
GMM estimations, yet it now enters significantly and with the expected positive sign in the fixed effects regressions. Results for the 
specification tests indicate once again that although the AR(1) and AR(2) are still well behaved under all GMM estimations, the Sargan 
and Difference Sargan Tests for the System estimator are either rejected or only marginally accepted. 
22 This result does not change if we control for possible endogeneity of leverage by including its lags in the instrument matrix. 
23 A number of regression statistics are considered to examine the validity of our GMM estimations. The AR(1) and AR(2) tests for 
whiteness of the residuals behave as expected in the GMM Difference estimators of Table 11: there is significant negative first order 
serial correlation of residuals, yet no higher order serial correlation. Furthermore, the Sargan Test for moment conditions cannot be 
rejected at conventional confidence levels.  
24 Estimations are available upon request. 
25 Furthermore, unreported estimations actually show that results do not change when we include sectoral data for exports instead of 
firm-level data. 
26 Our sample size is reduced significantly as we do not have available openness data for all sectors included in the sample.  





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notice finally that some of the most consistent results refer to macroeconomic variables 
such as the exchange rate and the exchange rate devaluation. It must be pointed out that putting too 
much emphasis on these coefficients is problematic because these variables, which are common to 
all firms and only vary across time, are likely to be correlated with a set of omitted macro variables 
that could be captured in a year-specific component of the error term. Thus, the coefficient attached 
to macroeconomic variables may be inconsistent. In Appendix Table 7, we present some 
specifications in which we drop the non-interacted macro variables and include year specific 
effects
27. 
 Although we present results for only one of the available measures of dollar debt, short-
term debt, and exports, results do not change when alternative definitions are included. Notice that 
most interactions of macro variables with firm characteristics are not significant for the GMM 
estimators, except in the System estimator where the interactive term of exports and the exchange 
rate has a counterintuitive sign. This lack of significance holds even when the interactive terms are 
included individually (in unreported regressions). Nonetheless, the fixed effects regression does 
show satisfactory results in terms of the tradeability interactive terms. Regarding specification tests, 
notice that the time effects are always jointly significant, and the GMM System estimator has poorly 
specified Sargan and Difference Sargan Tests. 
 
 
5.2  On the currency composition of debt 
 
In BC it is argued that the key determinant of the overall sign that real exchange rate devaluation has 
on firm investment is the correlation between the currency composition of debt and the exchange 
rate sensitivity of profits at the firm level. Moreover, they argue that their finding that firms holding 
dollar debt actually invest more than firms holding peso debt in the period following a devaluation is 
due to the fact that firms match the currency composition of debt with the elasticity of their income 
to the real exchange rate. Under this interpretation, dollarization of liabilities should be higher in 
firms that could be expected to benefit from a devaluation. Lending support to this hypothesis, BC 
report the results of a set of simple regressions where the ratio of dollar debt to total liabilities is a 
(positive) function of several proxies for the sensitivity of profits to the real exchange rate. In what 
follows we replicate some of their exercises and extend them in several directions to check whether 
this result holds in our data.   
 
  In Table 12 we consider a set of alternative specifications for the determinants of debt 
denomination. In particular, we are interested in knowing whether larger firms have more access to 
external credit. Also, the tradeability of firms’ output and inputs is presumably an important 
component of firms’ foreign indebtedness to the extent that firms are interested in “matching” their 
income streams with their liabilities. Obviously, perhaps the most important determinant of the 
extent of dollar indebtedness is the interest rate differential that each firm faces when considering 
different financing options. Since we are working with low frequency data, it is difficult to find a 
reliable measure of such differential. Finally, a number of authors have found that firms with 
international operations are more likely to hold foreign debt. Although in our data set the 
information on whether a firm is a parent or subsidiary is unreliable, we include the overall share of 
foreign investment in each firm as an additional control.  
                                                 
27 We also experimented by interacting firm-specific variables (like dollar debt, share of exports, and share of imports) with year 
dummies to examine whether the coefficients were different during the period in which the currency depreciates. These interactions 
never turned to be significant under any of the specifications. 
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  The results presented in Table 12 clearly show that foreign debt is positively correlated with 
firms´ size (as captured by the logarithm of the value of its assets). In the first column of Table 12 a 
simple random effects panel data estimation reveals further that firms belonging to a tradable sector 
(agriculture, manufacturing or mining) have a significantly higher share of dollar debt to total debt, 
as captured by the coefficient of the openness dummy. In this equation, the degree of foreign 
participation in ownership is also a significant determinant of indebtedness in dollars.  This simple 
regression is nonetheless problematic since conventional estimators are biased and inconsistent in 
the context of limited dependent variables
28. Thus, we estimate a Tobit model in the second column 
of Table 12. Also, besides form the extent of dollar indebtedness, we are interested in the 
determinants of whether or not to acquire debt in dollars.  Thus, a Probit model for the likelihood 
of holding dollar debt is presented in column 3. Results are qualitatively unchanged: size and 
openness are important determinants of foreign indebtedness. The extent of foreign participation 
remains an important determinant, albeit at lower significance levels. 
 
Table 12. Determinants of Debt Denomination  
 
These results suggest that there is some evidence  and income streams, to 
e extent that firms in more open sectors
29 tend to have foreign debt more often as well as larger 
shares of dollar debt. Nonetheless, dollar indebtedness for firms in our sample is quite often trade-
                                                
Random effects 
GLS Tobit Probit Fixed Effects Tobit Probit
Independent variables
Openness Dummy 3.067543*** 29.38689*** 3.13981***
(0.3387) (1.0607) (0.1251)
Exports 0.00187** 0.0888041*** 0.0140431***
(0.061198715) (0.01331827) (0.0016394)
Imports 0.51343*** 0.8007111*** 0.23369***
(0.115) (0.1947) (0.0283)
Log (Assets) 1.0857*** 3.433*** 0.601237*** 1.2543*** 4.1765*** 0.7081***
(0.086477) (0.2510) (0.0296) (0.112) (0.3286) (0.0302)
Foreign participation  0.00953*** 0.0277** 0.001877** 0.10242** 0.0211** 0.0018*
(0,0002182) (0.0007) (0.000896) (0.0033) (0.0074) (0.00989)
Constant -29.2273*** -95.8459*** -13.94912*** -15.7267369*** -81.88*** -1.755***
(3.87214) 4,981371 (0.482641) (1.741) (5.4535) (0.488)
No of observations 15900 15900 15900 15900 15900 15900
Likelihood Ratio Test (Chi^2)  1075.78 [0.000]  1714.13 [0.000]  380.854 [0.000] 578.69 [0.000]
Wald-test 283.82 [0.000] 1254.42 [0.000] 1203.27 [0.000] 193.73 [0.000]  231.24 [0.000]
R-square 0.09 0.0619
Pseudo R-square 0.07 0.42 0.09 0.075
Notes: 
Asymptotic standard errors in parenthesis
p-values for regression statistics appear in [ ]
*, significant at the 90% level, **at the 95%, *** at the 99%
Dependent Variable: Foreign Debt to Total Debt 
 
 of matching of liabilities
th
 
28 In particular, since the dependent variable is truncated, the appropriate distribution of the error term must take this issue into 
account. Maximum likelihood procedures, whereby a log-likelihood function having a component for those observations that are 
“uncensored” and those that are “censored” is maximized, can be applied in this context to obtain consistent estimators.  
btedness.    
29 Besides from these regressions, we also performed regressions where the degree of sectoral openness, defined as the ratio of 
sectoral exports plus imports to total sectoral production, is considered instead of the openness dummy. Results also indicate that 
openness, size and the extent of foreign participation are significant determinants of the existence and extent of dollar inde
  24 
related.  Thus, in the three final columns of Table 12 we drop the openness dummy and consider 
instead firms´ exports and imports as additional dependent variables. Initially, we run a simple 
regression where we control for firm specific effects and obtain very imprecise estimates. As before, 
this regression can be criticized on the grounds that the dependent variable lies between zero and 
one. Our Tobit and Probit
30 regressions show a very interesting result: both exports and imports are a 
significant and positive determinant of the existence and extent of foreign indebtedness. Moreover, 
the coefficient associated with imports is several times larger than the one of exports. Thus, 
although firms might attempt to “match” their revenue with liabilities, importing firms are actually 
engaged more often in dollar indebtedness and have a higher share of dollar debt. This highlights the 
importance of the cost channel that we mentioned in our descriptive section. The importance of 
imports for dollar indebtedness is quite strong. Actually, in (unreported) regressions where exports 
and imports are excluded and net exports are included instead, net exports enter significantly and 






he recent behaviour of the Colombian economy has been characterized by increased 
atility.  After a period of significant currency appreciation associated with 
important capital inflows, the exchange rate experienced a strong real depreciation in response to 
Our 
sults suggest that the effect of a real exchange rate devaluation on investment is negative, significant, 
size and, albeit less strongly, to the extent of foreign ownership. There is 
vidence that exporting firms and firms in more open sectors tend to have larger shares of dollar 
deb




capital flight. While among policy makers the favorable view of exchange rate devaluation for firm 
investment has prevailed, there is a recent and increasing concern in the literature for the possible 
detrimental effects of devaluations in the presence of foreign indebtedness. Foreign denominated 
currency, it is argued, leads to a negative balance sheet effect that constraint firms’ investment.  
 
  This paper is an attempt to contribute to this debate on empirical grounds. We examine the 
determinants of investment for a large sample of Colombian firms in the period 1995-2001. 
re
and economically meaningful. We also find clear evidence indicating that foreign indebtedness, if 
anything, makes matters worse. Nonetheless, our estimations also imply that there is a positive 
impact of the level of the exchange rate on investment. Furthermore, there is weak evidence 
indicating that this effect is higher for exporting firms and lower for importing firms. A noteworthy 
result from our basic estimations is the fact that the real interest rate --and its interaction with 
corporate debt maturity--, arguably an important determinant of firm investment, is rarely 
statistically significant. 
 
We also examine the determinants of debt denomination and find that foreign debt is positively 
correlated with firms´ 
e
t.  Nonetheless, imports are a significant determinant of foreign indebtedness as well, given that 
dollar indebtedness is often trade-related. The effect of imports on debt denomination is several 
times larger than that of exports. Thus, although firms might attempt to “match” their revenue with 
                                                 
30 Logistic regressions were also performed and results were very similar. 
31 For all estimations we report (and fail to accept) Likelihood Ratio and Wald tests for the joint lack of significance of the included 
regressors. 
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Appendix 1.  The BC set-up: summary and extensions 
 
A summary of the BC set-up 
 
In a two-period world, a continuum of firms holding a fraction β of their total liabilities (normalized 
to 1) in dollars seek to maximize their profits in period t+1 as given by: 
 
(2)  1 1 1 1 1 1
 
The first term at the right hand side of (2) are earnings before interest payments.  For each firm, the 
capital stock at period t, Kt, is predetermined, as is their fraction of dollar debt.  Function g captures 
the response of 
) ( ) ( ) ; ( ) ; , ( + + + + + + − = t t t t t t t K W r K F e g K e β β π . 
profits to changes in the real exchange rate. Firms borrow capital at an interest rate 
at is decreasing in net worth (W):  th
 
(3)  )) 1 ( ( β β π − + − = e W .  t t t
 
Devaluations reduce net worth because they increase the domestic currency value of foreign 
liabilities. Firms choose  1 + t K  so as to maximize (2) subject to (3) and to an exchange rate level in 
period t+1 that exhibits persistence, e ) ( 1 t t e µ = + .  The F.O.C. implicitly defines an optimal demand 
r capital, whose derivation with respect to the exchange rate leads to BC’s competitiveness and  fo
net-worth channels on investment.
32  
 
(4)  [] β β σ µ β θ − + = + +
+ ) ( ) ; ( ' ) ( ' ) ; ( ' 1 1
1
t t t t t t







The first term in (4) is the “competitiveness effect”. BC consider the case in which  0 ) ( ' ; 1 ≥ + β t e g
0 ) ( ' ≥ e µ , this implies a positive 
 that  ( ' ) ; 1 β + t e g  might be negative.
) ( ' ; 1 β +
)
t e g
( ; 1 +
 is negative, a 
0 >>
g to a decline in investment. On the other hand,
' β t e g ), earnings
. 
s long as the exchange rate exhibits persistence is such that  A t
competitiveness effect of devaluations on investment. A more general case —for instance, if 
imported inputs are important in production— should  consider  
he second term in (4), capturing the net worth channel, is ambiguous. If  T
devaluation reduces earnings and net worth, leadin  
r a sufficiently strong matching of liabilities and income streams ( fo  
increase with a devaluation, leading to higher investment and compensating the rise in foreign 
denominated liabilities (as captured by –β).  
 
Following BC, we consider a “neutral” exchange rate for which the peso value of debt is 








d t t . The 
                                                 
32  Where    0
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β
θ  and  [] 0 ) ( ) ; ( ' 1 ≥ − = + β β σ t t t K F e g .  
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differential effect o  levels of “dollar” 
indebtedness is: 
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The effect of  imported inputs 
 
From (5) it is clear that the effect on investment of a devaluation can be either increasing or 
decreasing in β. BC consider the case of “weak” matching of liabilities, where  0





e dg t .
33  
This assumption hinges on the fact ) ; ( ' 1 β + t e g
0 ) ; ( ' 1 < + β t e g ?   Then it might be that  0






 that   has been assumed positive. What if imported 
ts are so important that  inpu ;  firms with 
uitting the “dogged” defense of the exchange rate allows interest rates to decrease. Thus, in 
addition to the idiosyncratic decrease in net worth, a macroeconomic channel affects the rate at 
h firms rent capital. Firms maximize profits in period t+1, now given by: 
 
more dollar debt face a sharper decrease in profits as the exchange rate depreciates. In this case, a 
devaluation unambiguously decreases investment, and investment falls more in firms with higher 
dollar debt.  
 




[ ] 1 1
*
1 1 1 1 1 ) ; ( ) ( ) ( ) ; ( ) ; , ( + + + + + + + − + − = t t t t t t t t t K e e r W r K F e g K e β β β π   (6) 
 
domestic interest rates. When the policymaker quits the “dogged” defense of the exchange rate, and 
a devaluation does occur, expectations for a devaluation disappear or decrease, and interest rates fall: 
0 ) ; ( ' 1
* ≥ − + β t t e e r . Firms with a higher fraction of peso debt will be favored more by a decrease in 
domestic interest rates
34. F.O.C for firm’s optimization implicitly defines an optimal demand for 
capital which, in addition to BC’s competitiveness and net-worth channels, depends on a 
“macroeconomic channel”:  
 








In (6), the second term for the interest rate shows that higher devaluation expectations imply higher 
[] ) 1 ) ( ' ( ) ( ) ; ( ' ) 1 − + − + + t t t t t t
t
e K F e g µ δ β β σ . 
 
                                                 
33 Presumably, risk averse firms will choose a composition of debt that will match the exchange rate sensibilities of their balance sheet 
and income stream. It could also be the case that creditors charge more to firm’s without a proper currency matching. In equilibrium 
there would be a correlation between currency composition of liabilities and the “tradeability” of output.   
34 Where   
0 ) ) ( ( '



















  30 
The macro effect (third term on the RHS of (7)) has a simple interpretation.  As long as   
1 ) ( ' 0 < < t e µ  —i.e. allowing the exchange rate to weaken today will not lead to a more than 
roportional weakening tomorrow— a devaluation has a positive impact on investment. The total 
t on investment is still ambiguous; ultimately an empirical matter. The differential effect on 
stment of a devaluation across firms can be found by implicit differentiation of (7). This total 
ffect is the sum of the competitiveness and net worth channels as well as an additional term 
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The way the macroeconomic effect on investment varies for firms with different proportions of 
dollar debt —the third term   (8)— may be interpreted  t, notice that 
under the assumption of moderate persistence of the exchange rate –-i.e.  0 ) 1 ) ( ' ( < − t e µ —  
concavity of the production function implies that 
1
at the RHS of as follows. Firs
0 ) 1 > .  Thus, the  ) ( ' (










e e t t ) ) ( −
0 ) > − t e  and note  ) ( ( '
*
t e r µ
β d
l. In other words,  for firms with a 
sign of the expression is determined by 
µ dr ( '
. Recall that 
that for highly “dollar indebted” firms interest rates might increase less if devaluation expectations 
are high, since such firms presumably depend less on domestic credit conditions. Thus, 
µ e e dr t t ) ) ( ( ' −
 is negative and so is the “macroeconomic” channe
proportion of dollar debt a devaluation, by decreasing domestic interest rates, will result in a lower increase in 
vestment.  The combined effect of changes in earnings, in liabilities, and in domestic interest rates on 
high 
in
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Appendix 2.  Data definition 
 
In this appendix, we list the main variables used in the analysis.  As explained in Section 4, some 
firm-level data was combined with aggregate macroeconomic or sectoral data in constructing 
relevant variables. In particular, import input shares were imputed to each firm by mapping each 
irm’s sector with the most disaggregated f
im
 sector available in National Accounts Data.  Sectoral 
ported input shares were computed in turn as the ratio of imported intermediate purchases by 
each sector to total intermediate purchases, both domestic and imported. Such data is available from 
the economy-wide input-output matrix, with 60 sectors being the thinner disaggregation available. 
, in constructing the rate of inventory investment, the real change in inventories was computed 
by deflating the original firm level data by the most disaggregated data available on sectoral producer 
price indices (PPI).  In those cases were there was no satisfactory disaggregation of the PPI to match 




available form the authors upon request. 
 
 
1.  Total Debt=Total liabilities.  Balance sheet. 
2.  Short-term Debt=Total liabilities d
(long and short-term).  Balance sheet annex, no. 9. 
rm Foreign Debt=Short-term liabilities with foreign banks, corporations and foreign 
5.  Foreign Financial Debt= Liabilities with foreign banks and corporations (long and short-
term).  Balance sheet annex, no. 9. 
 
ue in less than one year.  Balance sheet. 
3.  Foreign or “Dollar” Debt= Liabilities with foreign banks, corporations and foreign suppliers 
4.  Short-te
suppliers.  Balance sheet annex, no. 9. 
.  Foreign Trade Debt= Liabilities with foreign suppliers.  Balance sheet annex, no. 9. 
7.  Domestic Debt= Liabilities with domestic banks, corporations and national suppliers (long 
and short-term).  Balance sheet annex, no. 9. 
8. Short-term Domestic Debt=Current liabilities with domestic banks, corporations and 
suppliers.  Balance sheet annex, no. 9. 
9.  Domestic Financial Debt= Liabilities with domestic banks and corporations (long and short-
term).  Balance sheet annex, no. 9. 
10. Domestic Trade Debt= Liabilities with national suppliers.  Balance sheet annex, no. 9. 
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1.  Investment in fixed capital= Net purchase of properties, plant and equipment.  Income 
statement. For estimation, this variable is expressed as % of total assets. 
 
Other Relevant Variables 
1.  Total assets.  Balance sheet. 
2.  Exports= Operational income generated abroad.  Balance sheet annex, no. 15. 
3.  Imports= Purchases of goods not produced by the firm and of raw materials abroad.   
Balance sheet annex, no. 15. 
4.  Net Exports= Total exports minus total imports.  Balance sheet. 
5.  Interest expense: accrued interest on financial liabilities.  Balance sheet annex, no.6. 
 
Macroeconomic Variables 




1.  Real exc
2.  Real interest rate. Source: Superintendencia B
3.  Sectoral output and sectoral output growth. Source: DANE. 
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Appendix 3.  Additional econometric results 
 
Appendix Table 1 
 Regressions for specification in Table 11, Dollar Debt to total Debt  System GMM
 
  1 step 2 step
Ind
   
Lag
 
    
DIRECT   
    
Rea c 0.0385696 0.0355561
  (0.03182) (0.03116)




Real interest lending rate -0.048505 -0.0480274
(0.482) (0.4706)
    
INT  
   
∆ L 0.0122787 -0.00193601
  (0.03802) (0.03672)
    
Lag   0.00027959 -0.00360594
  (0.003878) (0.003057)
  
Lagged Imports x Real Exchange Rate -0.000513359 0.0000514612
  (0.0008275) (0.0008384)
    
Real interest lending rate x Short-Term Domestic Debt to Total Domestic Debt 0.0016442 0.0013676
  (0.006161) (0.006073)
    
CONTROLS   
    
Lagged "Dollar" Debt to Total Debt 0.013572 0.0085325
  (0.01192) (0.01091)
    
Lagged Exports -0.126124 0.34411
  (0.4407) (0.347)
    
Lagged Imports 0.0405237 -0.00622578
  (0.08473) (0.08456)
    
Lagged Short-Term Domestic Debt to Total  DomesticDebt -0.154978 -0.111519
  (0.6849) (0.6737)
    
Leverage 0.124027*** 0.0753492***
  (0.02276) (0.01849)
    
Sectorial Output Growth 0.0387018** 0.0313648**
  (0.01655) (0.01525)
    
Wald Test (joint) 231.9 [0.000] ** 200.8 [0.000] **
Sargan Test 90.94 [0.000] ** 70.59 [0.003] **
Sargan Difference Test 61.85 [0.000] ** 41.5 [0.002] **
AR(1) test (N[0,1]) -10.59 [0.000] ** -10.19 [0.000] **
AR(2) test (N[0,1]) 0.5139 [0.607] 0.7771 [0.437]
GMM System




ged dependent variable 0.0510444*** 0.0585711***
(0.01263) (0.0115)
 EFFECTS
l ex hange rate index
 






og (bilateral US "real exchange rate" - end of period) x Dollar Debt
ged Exports x Real Exchange Rate
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System GMM Regressions for specification in Table 11, Dollar Debt to Total Assets 
Appendix Table 2 
 
  2 step
Independent variables  
    
Lagged dependent variable 0.0566764*** 0.0468656***
  (0.01559) (0.01443)
    
DIRECT EFFECTS   
    
Real exchange rate index 0.0451541 -0.0313687
  (0.04731) (0.04498)
    
∆ Log (bilateral US "real exchange rate") -2.80577*** -2.41334***
  (0.6715) (0.6354)
    
Real interest lending rate 0.185431 0.0379565
  (0.254) (0.2271)
    
INTERACTIONS   
    
∆ Log (bilateral US "real exchange rate" - end of period) x Dollar Debt -0.000995127 -0.00932673
  (0.07717) (0.07603)
    
Lagged Exports x Real Exchange Rate 0.000169076 0.00656351
  (0.005743) (0.004939)
    
Lagged Imports x Real Exchange Rate -0.000828499 -0.000483925
  (0.0007389) (0.0007483)
    
Real interest lending rate x Short-Term Domestic Debt to Total Domestic Debt -0.000787003 0.00123948
  (0.003523) (0.00316)
    
CONTROLS   
    
Lagged "Dollar" Debt to Total Assets -0.0995233** -0.0716093*
  (0.03973) (0.03918)
    
Lagged Exports -0.0267884 -0.799305
  (0.6639) (0.5814)
    
Lagged Imports 0.0759854 0.0510808
  (0.08153) (0.08129)
    
Lagged Short-Term Domestic Debt to Total  DomesticDebt 0.10093 -0.0940319
  (0.4012) (0.3613)
    
Leverage 0.154706*** 0.0862704*
  (0.04839) (0.05067)
    
Sectorial Output Growth 0.047204** 0.0526959***
  (0.01878) (0.0173)
    
Observations 15900 15900
Wald Test (joint) 198.3 [0.000] ** 168.9 [0.000] **
Sargan Test 47.02 [0.033] * 46.48 [0.037] *
Sargan Difference Test 16.12 [0.007]  20.63 [0.001]
AR(1) test (N[0,1]) -10.25 [0.000] ** -9.545 [0.000] **
AR(2) test (N[0,1]) 0.3910 [0.696] -0.5802 [0.562]
Notes   
Robust standard errors in parenthesis   
For GMM estimators, all variables enter in differences
Instruments used include suitably lagged values of the dependent variable as well as lagged levels of foreign indebted
 and imports. Length of lags used restricted.
p- values fo regression statistics appear in [ ]
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Appendix Table 3 
Baseline regressions wit ollar Debt to Total Debt   hout interest rate terms, D
 
   
  Fixed Effects  1 step 2 step 1 step 2 step
Independent variables     
       
Lagged dependent variable  0.060684*** 0.0568708*** 0.0672911*** 0.0555354***
   (0.01331) (0.01207) (0.01486) (0.014)
       
DIRECT EFFECTS      
       
Real exchange rate index 0.0289011*** 0.104763*** 0.0983558*** 0.0862359** 0.0306044
  (0.008311) (0.03226) (0.02921) (0.04244) (0.03766)
       
∆ Log (bilateral US "real exchange rate") -4.34678*** -2.68045*** -2.39647*** -3.3374*** -2.08997***
  (0.3637) (0.7115) (0.5809) (0.7207) (0.6207)
       
INTERACTIONS      
       
∆ Log (bilateral US "real exchange rate" - end of period) x Dollar Debt 0.0231572 -0.0142603 -0.0334814 0.00399258 0.0153945
  (0.02135) (0.04332) (0.04288) (0.04396) (0.04443)
       
Lagged Exports x Real Exchange Rate 0.000342906* -0.00514991 -0.00481164 -0.00479346 -0.00141498
  (0.000199) (0.003747) (0.003027) (0.004885) (0.004345)
       
Lagged Imports x Real Exchange Rate -0.00127479*** -0.00016746 0.0000806218 -0.00100591 -0.000471747
  (0.0002518) (0.0006733) (0.0006233) (0.0007464) (0.0007054)
       
CONTROLS      
       
Lagged "Dollar" Debt to Total Debt 0.00485494 -0.033567 -0.0336113* -0.0121611 0.0035916
  (0.004952) (0.02223) (0.01991) (0.02332) (0.02317)
       
Lagged Exports -0.0328154 0.64407 0.537057 0.622482 0.245857
  (0.02259) (0.4451) (0.36) (0.5631) (0.5087)
       
Lagged Imports 0.122729*** -0.00476282 -0.0119237 0.0892918 0.0454266
  (0.02628) (0.07305) (0.06632) (0.08005) (0.07494)
       
Leverage 0.0019507 0.0524409 0.0236195 0.145184*** 0.141121***
  (0.003806) (0.04897) (0.03809) (0.02833) (0.0305)
       
Sectorial Output Growth 0.0171227*** 0.00335923 0.003609 0.00125848 0.00686153
  (0.005061) (0.007191) (0.006737) (0.008518) (0.007539)
       
Observations 15900 15900 15900 15900 15900
Wald Test (joint) 288.2 [0.000] ** 114.0 [0.000] ** 112.3 [0.000] ** 283.7 [0.000] ** 291.7 [0.000] **
Sargan Test   32.61 [0.294] 27.41 [0.550] 54.44 [0.015] * 66.10 [0.001] **
Sargan Difference Test     21.83  [0.001]  38.69  [0.000]
AR(1) test (N[0,1])   -9.639 [0.000] ** -10.11 [0.000] ** -10.06 [0.000] ** -10.07 [0.000] **
AR(2) test (N[0,1]) 0.01249 [0.990] 0.6778 [0.498] -0.3017 [0.763] -0.05488 [0.956]
Notes      
Robust standard errors in parenthesis      
For GMM estimators, all variables enter in differences
Instruments used include suitably lagged values of the dependent variable as well as lagged levels of foreign indebtedenss
 and imports. Length of lags used restricted.
p- values fo regression statistics appear in [ ]
*, significant at the 90% level, **at the 95%, *** at the 99%
GMM Difference GMM System
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Appendix Table 4 
 
Baseline regressions without interest rate terms, Dollar Debt to Total Assets  
   
  Fixed Effects  1 step 2 step 1 step 2 step
Independent variables     
       
Lagged dependent variable  0.0589467*** 0.0583056*** 0.0576732*** 0.0448386***
   (0.01311) (0.01222) (0.01464) (0.01355)
       
DIRECT EFFECTS      
       
Real exchange rate index 0.0287329*** 0.104392*** 0.101862*** 0.0832588* 0.00481421
  (0.008303) (0.03169) (0.02946) (0.04479) (0.04253)
       
∆ Log (bilateral US "real exchange rate") -4.3026*** -2.74052*** -2.67441*** -2.93907*** -2.24036***
  (0.3562) (0.6746) (0.5651) (0.6749) (0.6238)
       
INTERACTIONS      
       
∆ Log (bilateral US "real exchange rate" - end of period) x Dollar Debt 0.027396 -0.00984306 -0.0144148 -0.00331825 0.03643
  (0.03872) (0.07099) (0.06806) (0.07513) (0.07135)
       
Lagged Exports x Real Exchange Rate 0.000345377* -0.00515605 -0.00503223* -0.00581448 -0.000242589
  (0.000199) (0.003597) (0.002996) (0.005033) (0.004451)
       
Lagged Imports x Real Exchange Rate -0.00126955*** -0.000163876 -0.000109809 -0.000640273 0.0000086228
  (0.0002517) (0.0006756) (0.0006296) (0.0007358) (0.0007332)
       
CONTROLS      
       
Lagged "Dollar" Debt to Total Assets 0.00419931 -0.0819874** -0.0602868* -0.106134*** -0.0870325**
  (0.01036) (0.04079) (0.03552) (0.04088) (0.0408)
       
Lagged Exports -0.0330111 0.625397 0.558359 0.656571 -0.00328401
  (0.0226) (0.4188) (0.3545) (0.5854) (-0.5299)
       
Lagged Imports 0.122137*** -0.00603747 -0.00895804 0.0433722 -0.0140957
  (0.02628) (0.07308) (0.06666) (0.07985) (0.07862)
       
Leverage 0.00197065 0.0599638 0.00910562 0.150105*** 0.107983***
  (0.003855) (0.04969) (0.03874) (0.0388) (0.03519)
       
Sectorial Output Growth 0.0171828*** 0.00301954 0.00364243 0.00329561 0.00626816
  (0.00506) (0.007231) (0.006803) (0.007239) (0.007118)
       
Observations 15900 15900 15900 15900 15900
Wald Test (joint) 289.7 [0.000] ** 114.9 [0.000] ** 111.5 [0.000] ** 179.3 [0.000] ** 145.4 [0.000] **
Sargan Test   32.83 [0.284] 27.81 [0.528] 54.89 [0.013] * 54.91 [0.013] *
Sargan Difference Test     22.06  [0.001]  27.1  [0.000]
AR(1) test (N[0,1])   -9.852 [0.000] ** -10.14 [0.000] ** -10.41 [0.000] ** -10.17 [0.000] **
AR(2) test (N[0,1]) 0.1044 [0.917] 0.7362 [0.462] -0.1024 [0.918] 0.2702 [0.787]
Notes      
Robust standard errors in parenthesis      
For GMM estimators, all variables enter in differences
Instruments used include suitably lagged values of the dependent variable as well as lagged levels of foreign indebtedenss
 and imports. Length of lags used restricted.
p- values fo regression statistics appear in [ ]
*, significant at the 90% level, **at the 95%, *** at the 99%
Dependent Variable: Fixed Capital Investment
GMM Difference GMM System
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Appendix Table 5 
Regressions with sect bt to Total Debt 
 
oral openness, Dollar De
Fixed Effects  1 step 2 step 1 step 2 step
Independent variables
Lagged dependent variable 0.0294205 0.0388331* 0.0433078 0.0797469***
(0.02412) (0.02332) (0.02755) (0.02251)
DIRECT EFFECTS
Real exchange rate index -0.00337767 0.397632 0.313356 0.00644114 0.285041
(0.005365) (0.2947) (0.3126) (0.21) (0.1991)
∆ log (bilateral US "real exchange rate" - end of period) -4.21107*** -3.45025** -3.93554*** -2.88693* -3.28616**
(0.4494) (1.65) (1.48) (1.656) (1.629)
Real interest lending rate -0.677727 0.487651 0.384196 2.44553* 2.66785**
(3.85) (1.287) (1.09) (1.41) (1.353)
INTERACTIONS
∆ log( bilateral US "real exchange rate" - end of period) x Dollar Debt -0.00673149 -0.0435505 -0.044052 0.0205806 -0.0648021
(0.02462) (0.07138) (0.06524) (0.09244) (0.08677)
Opennes x Real Exchange Rate 0.000155697** -0.00272487 -0.00191143 0.000238218 -0.00185396
-0.00006373 (0.002501) (0.002631) (0.001542) (0.001453)
Real interest lending rate x Short-Term Domestic Debt to Total Domestic Debt -0.0134551 -0.00753995 -0.00578021 -0.0300923 -0.037315**
(0.04255) (0.01676) (0.01343) (0.01888) (0.01866)
CONTROLS
Lagged "Dollar" Debt to Total Debt 0.00113469 0.0374499 0.0284164 -0.0495786** -0.025998
(0.006069) (0.04729) (0.04357) (0.01937) (0.0179)
Lagged oppennes -0.0232401*** 0.339558 0.229319 -0.0333141 0.197652
-0.008167 (0.3264) (0.3433) -0.1705 (0.1596)
Short-Term Domestic Debt to Total Domestic Debt 0.0188638 0.890709 0.68515 3.4132 4.20517**
(0.04785) (1.87) (1.496) (2.095) (2.061)
Leverage -0.00679583 0.205827* 0.142409 0.23118*** 0.152254***
(0.004827) (0.1192) (0.09359) (0.05314) (0.03731)
Sectorial GDP growth -0.00194633 -0.0110969 -0.00500673 0.0555089 -0.0123684
(0.00957) (0.08085) (0.08631) (0.0687) (0.0689)
Observations 9 7 6 69 7 6 69 7 6 69 7 6 69 7 6 6
Wald Test (joint) 200.2 [0.000] ** 47.18 [0.000] ** 47.42 [0.000] ** 164.2 [0.000] ** 163.8 [0.000] **
Sargan Test 9.816 [0.709] 8.852 [0.784] 18.39 [0.682] 20.89 [0.527]
Sargan Difference Test 8.574 [0.477] 12.038 [0.211]
AR(1) test (N[0,1]) -4.721 [0.000] ** -4.664 [0.000] ** -5.640 [0.000] ** -3.558 [0.000] **
AR(2) test (N[0,1]) -0.9393 [0.348] -0.2190 [0.827] -1.344 [0.179] -1.365 [0.172]
Notes
Robust standard errors in parenthesis
For GMM estimators, all variables enter in differences
Instruments used include suitably lagged values of the dependent variable as well as lagged levels of foreign indebtedenss
 and imports. Length of lags used restricted.
p- values fo regression statistics appear in [ ]
*, significant at the 90% level, **at the 95%, *** at the 99%
GMM Difference GMM System
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Appendix Table 6 
Regressions with sectoral openness and no interest rate terms 
 
Fixed Effects  1 step 2 step 1 step 2 step
Independent variables
Lagged dependent variable 0.0330675 0.035885 0.0536369** 0.0753637***
(0.02545) (0.02506) (0.02486) (0.02736)
DIRECT EFFECTS
Real exchange rate index -0.00252178 0.388855*** 0.33643*** 0.211146*** 0.241812***
(0.005138) (0.1422) (0.1295) (0.06983) (0.06447)
∆ log (bilateral US "real exchange rate" - end of period) -4.28733*** -3.10108** -3.42711** -4.6546*** -4.28333***
(0.4592) (1.539) (1.371) (1.353) (1.186)
INTERACTIONS
∆ log( bilateral US "real exchange rate" - end of period) x Dollar Debt -0.00563251 -0.0378105 -0.0227778 0.0185568 -0.00693677
(0.02453) (0.07293) (0.07189) (0.07579) (0.06858)
Opennes x Real Exchange Rate 0.00015964** -0.00257659* -0.00213878* -0.00115491** -0.00142516***
(0.00006372) (0.001409) (0.001268) (0.0004687) (0.0004418)
CONTROLS
Leverage -0.00760883 0.227978* 0.189498* 0.195444*** 0.1371***
(0.005059) (0.1248) (0.1131) (0.03954) (0.04378)
Lagged "Dollar" Debt to Total Debt 0.00069548 0.0272179 0.0271557 -0.0437217*** -0.0101801
(0.006046) (0.03757) (0.03566) (0.01548) (0.01438)
Lagged oppennes -0.00237296*** 0.325037 0.269293 0.122127** 0.152224***
(0.008165) (0.1989) (0.1795) (0.05291) (0.05061)
Sectorial GDP growth 0.00303428 0.0147457 0.00846464 0.0142444 0.0226302*
(0.006043) (0.01548) (0.0136) (0.0145) (0.01277)
Observations 9 7 6 69 7 6 69 7 6 69 7 6 69 7 6 6
Wald Test (joint) 182.7 [0.000] ** 46.34 [0.000] ** 43.50 [0.000] ** 183.6 [0.000] ** 182.8 [0.000] **
Sargan Test 10.03 [0.613] 8.205 [0.769] 36.73 [0.061] * 40.14 [0.028] *
Sargan Difference Test 26.7[0.002] 31.935 [0.000]
AR(1) test (N[0,1]) -7.217 [0.000] ** -7.338 [0.000] ** -7.755 [0.000] ** -6.831 [0.000] **
AR(2) test (N[0,1]) -1.138 [0.255] -0.8457 [0.398] 1.307 [0.191] 1.975 [0.048] *
Notes
Robust standard errors in parenthesis
For GMM estimators, all variables enter in differences
Instruments used include suitably lagged values of the dependent variable as well as lagged levels of foreign indebtedenss
 and imports. Length of lags used restricted.
p- values fo regression statistics appear in [ ]
*, significant at the 90% level, **at the 95%, *** at the 99%
Dependent Variable: Fixed Capital Investment
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Appendix Table 7 
 
Time effects regressions 
Fixed Effects  1 step 2 step 1 step 2 step
Independent variables
Lagged dependent variable 0.0582909*** 0.0547558*** 0.0711383*** 0.0791081***
(0.01316) (0.01193) (0.01473) (0.01544)
INTERACTIONS
∆ Log (bilateral US "real exchange rate" - end of period) x Dollar Debt 0.0199352 -0.0180206 -0.0330116 -0.0210648 -0.0257659
(0.02142) (0.03998) (0.03862) (0.04505) (0.04515)
Lagged Exports x Real Exchange Rate 0.00040213** -0.00435219 -0.00338736 -0.00341193 -0.00496478*
(0.0001977) (0.003582) (0.002572) (0.003941) (0.00295)
Lagged Imports x Real Exchange Rate -0.000463742* 0.000185679 0.000186622 -0.000389001 0.0000298742
(0.0002713) (0.0007086) (0.0005801) (0.0007321) (0.0006291)
Real interest lending rate x Short-Term Domestic Debt to Total Domestic Debt 0.0137815 0.000748276 -0.000231398 0.00226879 0.00242485
(0.03052) (0.005404) (0.004989) (0.006251) (0.005356)
CONTROLS
Lagged "Dollar" Debt to Total Assets 0.00592949 -0.0263088 -0.0271308 -0.0300185** -0.0189103
(0.004973) (0.02735) (0.02593) (0.01328) (0.01199)
Lagged Exports -0.0378848* 0.544223 0.379081 0.542672 0.696577**
(0.02247) (0.4074) (0.2935) (0.4672) (0.3414)
Lagged Imports 0.0431246 -0.0354086 -0.031298 0.0190108 -0.020806
(0.02784) (0.07706) (0.06139) (0.07757) (0.06501)
Lagged Short-Term Domestic Debt to Total  Domestic Debt -0.0126618 -0.0713125 0.0272706 -0.323294 -0.292693
(0.03421) (0.5965) (0.5429) (0.6913) (0.5944)
Leverage -0.000246901 0.0700531 0.0461119 0.0782022** 0.0525959***
(0.003721) (0.04999) (0.04006) (0.03067) (0.01922)
Observations 15900 15900 15900 15900 15900
Wald Test (joint) 17.83 [0.037] * 48.10 [0.000] ** 44.60 [0.000] ** 153.0 [0.000] ** 151.9 [0.000] **
Wald Test (time) 189.0 [0.000] ** 59.59 [0.000] ** 74.54 [0.000] ** 65.41 [0.000] ** 108.4 [0.000] **
Sargan Test 35.08 [0.240] 28.90 [0.523] 94.57 [0.000] ** 64.78 [0.022] *
Sargan Difference Test 59.49 [0.000] ** 31.935 [0.004] **
AR(1) test (N[0,1]) -9.891 [0.000] ** -10.10 [0.000] ** -9.816 [0.000] ** -10.48 [0.000] **
AR(2) test (N[0,1]) 0.1749 [0.861] 0.6740 [0.500] -0.8858 [0.376] -0.3716 [0.710]
Notes
Robust standard errors in parenthesis
For GMM estimators, all variables enter in differences
Instruments used include suitably lagged values of the dependent variable as well as lagged levels of foreign indebtedenss
 and imports. Length of lags used restricted.
p- values fo regression statistics appear in [ ]
*, significant at the 90% level, **at the 95%, *** at the 99%
Dependent Variable: Fixed Capital Investment
GMM Difference GMM System
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